Decisions by Judge 2007 to Present

Was Becerra denied his constitutional right to a jury trial as a result of an invalid waiver and, if so, is the proper remedy to remand for limited findings on that issue or to vacate his convictions and remand for a new trial?

2) Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining ADES had not met its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that severance of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.

(2) Did the trial court reversibly err by closing Appellants’ trial to all members of the public except the press without making specific findings or considering less restrictive alternatives?

(3) Did the trial court err in denying Appellant Armstrong’s motions for a judgment of acquittal on charges of conspiracy and misuse of body armor?

(4) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Armstrong’s motions to sever his trial from that of his codefendants?

2. Did the respondent judge err by finding real party in interest’s designated standard-of-care expert, a registered nurse with various nursing degrees, qualified to testify about the standard of care for and conduct of registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, and certified nursing assistants involved in the care of real party in interest’s now-deceased wife at petitioner Cornerstone Hospital, a long-term acute care facility, but not qualified to provide similar testimony and opinions about purely administrative decisions made by Cornerstone’s administrative staff?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering the father to pay half of the mother’s attorney fees and in holding him solely responsible for guardian ad litem fees incurred by daughter?

2. Do the court’s jury instructions require reversal of the defendant’s conviction?

2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in limiting defense counsel’s closing argument to eight minutes when the defendant raised no objection until after he had been found guilty?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender when he was convicted of one count of public sexual indecency, a misdemeanor offense?

2. Whether the reasoning of Graham v. Florida extends to the twelve felony counts for crimes appellant committed after he turned eighteen years of age.

3. Did the state fail to establish that two palm trees were “property,” or were worth more than $100, to support two felony arson-of-property convictions?

If the defendant was erroneously denied a suppression hearing, is the appropriate remedy reversal of her conviction?

Did the court err in denying appellant relief under A.R.S. § 48-3613, which provides a private right of action for the unauthorized alteration of a watercourse, when the appellee’s driveway and culvert were built without written authorization from the flood control district board, diverted a watercourse, and risked causing damage to the appellant’s property?

Did the court err in awarding attorney fees to the appellee and denying appellant’s fee request?

2. Whether the statutory interest rate applicable to a civil judgment or that applicable to a condemnation proceeding applies to an award in an inverse condemnation proceeding.

(2) Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment based on the claimants’ failure to file a notice of claim within 180 days after they knew or reasonably should have known claimant had been injured after driving over a road defect on a county-maintained road?