Decisions by Judge 2007 to Present

(2) Did the mandatory consecutive sentences required here by A.R.S. § 13-705 amount to cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by article II, § 15 of the Arizona Constitution?

(3) Does § 13-705 violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection by punishing the possession of child pornography more severely than other dangerous crimes against children that are committed directly against children?

2. Whether the defendant’s prior convictions for arson and conspiracy to commit arson occurred on the “same occasion” for purposes of A.R.S. § 13-604(M).

2. Whether the trial court erred by concluding the state did not violate Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), by exercising peremptory strikes against two African-American prospective jurors.

2. Whether the trial court fundamentally erred in reducing indigent defense fees to a criminal restitution order at sentencing.

2. Whether trial to an eight-person jury constituted fundamental error.

2. Was there sufficient evidence to support convictions for endangerment by threat of imminent death when some of the victims may have been in an interior room of the house but the bullets, shot from outside the house, had the capability of penetrating several layers of wall?

A.R.S. § 13-901.01 for the six non-methamphetamine offenses of which she was convicted.

II. Whether a cause of action for defamation—based on letters sent to third parties—accrues on the date the letters are published or the date the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the existence of the letters.

III. Whether communications between two agents of the same principal constitute “publication” for defamation purposes.

2) Whether the 2005 amendment to Pima County’s sewer connection fee ordinance unconstitutionally impaired an existing sewer fee agreement between Pima County and Robson Ranch Quail Creek, LLC.

2) Did the trial court err when it awarded attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) for tort claims that were based on the same set of facts as the underlying breach of contract claims?

3. If a defendant can waive the protection of Rule 17.4(f) and Rule 410 for statements made in connection with a breached plea agreement, did the defendant waive those protections here and did the respondent judge abuse his discretion by prohibiting the state from introducing these statements for all but impeachment purposes?

2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for attempted armed robbery when, while displaying a gun, he asked the victims if they had any money and they replied, “no”?