Decisions by Judge 2007 to Present

(2) Did the trial court reversibly err by closing Appellants’ trial to all members of the public except the press without making specific findings or considering less restrictive alternatives?

(3) Did the trial court err in denying Appellant Armstrong’s motions for a judgment of acquittal on charges of conspiracy and misuse of body armor?

(4) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Armstrong’s motions to sever his trial from that of his codefendants?

Was Becerra denied his constitutional right to a jury trial as a result of an invalid waiver and, if so, is the proper remedy to remand for limited findings on that issue or to vacate his convictions and remand for a new trial?

2) Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining ADES had not met its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that severance of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.

2. Did the respondent judge err by finding real party in interest’s designated standard-of-care expert, a registered nurse with various nursing degrees, qualified to testify about the standard of care for and conduct of registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, and certified nursing assistants involved in the care of real party in interest’s now-deceased wife at petitioner Cornerstone Hospital, a long-term acute care facility, but not qualified to provide similar testimony and opinions about purely administrative decisions made by Cornerstone’s administrative staff?

2. Was the evidence sufficient to permit the jury to find that the defendant was the same person previously convicted in another jurisdiction?

3. Was the trial court required to amend the presentence report pursuant to Rule 26.8(c), Ariz. R. Crim. P., based on the defendant’s allegations that it contained incorrect information?

2. Did the admission of written urinalysis results without requiring a laboratory employee to testify and be cross-examined violate appellant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington?

2. Can the trial court’s dismissal of the employee’s administrative appeal be alternatively upheld on the ground the Personnel Board lacked jurisdiction because the employee’s appeal was untimely?

2. Does A.R.S. § 33-422 require a seller of real estate to provide an affidavit of disclosure once the buyer has anticipatorily repudiated the purchase agreement?

2. Whether the statutory interest rate applicable to a civil judgment or that applicable to a condemnation proceeding applies to an award in an inverse condemnation proceeding.

Is an agreement creating such a covenant an unconscionable contract on the ground that it permits membership fees to be increased at the discretion of the recreational facility’s board of directors?

Is the agreement that creates such a covenant illusory or unilateral on the ground that mutuality of obligation is lacking because the owner of the community recreation facility has the right to modify terms of the agreement but the homeowner does not, except through the facility’s board of directors?

2. Whether the defendant’s prior convictions for arson and conspiracy to commit arson occurred on the “same occasion” for purposes of A.R.S. § 13-604(M).

2. Did the trial court err in allowing the jury to view portions of the child pornography found in defendant’s residence despite his offer to stipulate that the material was child pornography?

3. Did the trial court violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel of his choice when it denied the application of defendant’s father, an Illinois attorney, to appear pro hac vice?

4. To be guilty of a dangerous crime against children under A.R.S. § 13-604.01, must a defendant have known that the children depicted in child pornography the defendant possessed were under the age of fifteen?

5. Did the trial court violate Rule 15 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and commit fundamental error by allowing the state, in making its pretrial disclosure, to provide Coghill with copies of his computer hard drives rather than producing the original hard drives?

Was the defendant’s due process right to notice of the charges against him under the Arizona and United States Constitutions violated when the court allowed the amendment of his indictment during trial from transportation of a dangerous drug for sale to possession of a dangerous drug?

Did the trial court err in admitting an expert opinion that drugs possessed by the defendant were for sale, rather than personal use?

2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for attempted armed robbery when, while displaying a gun, he asked the victims if they had any money and they replied, “no”?

(2) Whether the state exerted improper influence over the testimony of a witness.

2. Was there sufficient evidence to support convictions for endangerment by threat of imminent death when some of the victims may have been in an interior room of the house but the bullets, shot from outside the house, had the capability of penetrating several layers of wall?

2. Whether the reasoning of Graham v. Florida extends to the twelve felony counts for crimes appellant committed after he turned eighteen years of age.

3. Did the state fail to establish that two palm trees were “property,” or were worth more than $100, to support two felony arson-of-property convictions?