Decisions by Judge 2007 to Present

(2) Did the mandatory consecutive sentences required here by A.R.S. § 13-705 amount to cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by article II, § 15 of the Arizona Constitution?

(3) Does § 13-705 violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection by punishing the possession of child pornography more severely than other dangerous crimes against children that are committed directly against children?

2. Did the trial court err in rejecting defendant’s post-conviction-relief claim that his decision to admit previous convictions was not voluntary because he allegedly had not been informed that admitting his previous convictions could result in an enhanced prison term and that the state was required to prove the fact of those convictions?

2. Did the trial court err in allowing the jury to view portions of the child pornography found in defendant’s residence despite his offer to stipulate that the material was child pornography?

3. Did the trial court violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel of his choice when it denied the application of defendant’s father, an Illinois attorney, to appear pro hac vice?

4. To be guilty of a dangerous crime against children under A.R.S. § 13-604.01, must a defendant have known that the children depicted in child pornography the defendant possessed were under the age of fifteen?

5. Did the trial court violate Rule 15 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and commit fundamental error by allowing the state, in making its pretrial disclosure, to provide Coghill with copies of his computer hard drives rather than producing the original hard drives?

2) Are the spouses of a person convicted of bigamy “victims” as defined by Arizona law?

3) May a court order a criminal defendant to pay restitution following a restitution hearing attended by neither the defendant nor his counsel?

2. Do the court’s jury instructions require reversal of the defendant’s conviction?

2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in limiting defense counsel’s closing argument to eight minutes when the defendant raised no objection until after he had been found guilty?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender when he was convicted of one count of public sexual indecency, a misdemeanor offense?

Can a seller of a bar be held liable for the negligent training of bar employees when the employees’ allegedly negligent conduct occurs after the seller no longer employs them, when they are employed by the purchaser and new operator of the bar?

2) May a court disregard the financial resources of a party who seeks an award of costs, expenses, and attorney fees under A.R.S. § 25-324(A) and consider only the financial resources of the party who would be paying the fee award?

Did the court err in denying appellant relief under A.R.S. § 48-3613, which provides a private right of action for the unauthorized alteration of a watercourse, when the appellee’s driveway and culvert were built without written authorization from the flood control district board, diverted a watercourse, and risked causing damage to the appellant’s property?

Did the court err in awarding attorney fees to the appellee and denying appellant’s fee request?

2. Was the evidence sufficient to permit the jury to find that the defendant was the same person previously convicted in another jurisdiction?

3. Was the trial court required to amend the presentence report pursuant to Rule 26.8(c), Ariz. R. Crim. P., based on the defendant’s allegations that it contained incorrect information?

2. Did the admission of written urinalysis results without requiring a laboratory employee to testify and be cross-examined violate appellant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington?

(2) Whether the state exerted improper influence over the testimony of a witness.

A.R.S. § 13-901.01 for the six non-methamphetamine offenses of which she was convicted.